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II.

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-22 (3)(j) (Supp. 1990) and Rule 3(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate
procedure

to consider

this appeal

from an order of the Third

Judicial District Court for Summit County, granting the motion of
plaintiff Furniture Distribution Center ("FDC") for partial summary
judgment against defendant Ann P. Miles ("Miles").
III. STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The sole issues presented by this appeal are
(1) whether the lower court erred in entering summary judgment
against

defendant

Miles

since

there

was

no

genuine

issue

of

material fact based upon Miles' failure under Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e)
and Rule 4-501

of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration

to

refute plaintiff FDC's sworn facts by proper affidavit; Busch Corp.
v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co./ 743 P.2d 1217 (Utah 1987);
(2)

whether

this

Court

should

review

appellant

Miles1

arguments, which are raised for the first time on appeal; Busch
Corp. v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co./ supra; and
(3)

whether, as a matter of law and undisputed fact, FDC was

entitled by statute and due process to notice by mail or equivalent
means of the final tax sale of FDC's property and, if so, whether
Summit County's failure to give FDC such notice invalidated the tax
sale as a matter of law.

See Mennonite Board of Missions v. Adams #

462 U.S. 791 (1983); Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank and Trust Co.,
339 U.S. 306 (1950); Fivas v. Petersen, 5 Utah 2d 280, 300 P.2d 635
(1956); Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-1351(2) (Supp. 1990).
1

IV.

DETERMINATIVE RULES & STATUTES

Rule 56(c), (e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and Rule
4-501(5)

of

the Utah Code

of Judicial

Administration

(amended 1990) are critical to this appeal.

(1988)

Rule 56(c),

(e)

provides in pertinent part:
(c) . . . The judgment sought shall be
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact that the moving
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law . . . .
(e) . . . When a motion for summary
judgment is made and supported [by affidavit]
as provided in this rule, an adverse party may
not rest upon the mere allegations or denials
of his pleading, but his response, by
affidavits or as otherwise provided in this
rule, must set forth specific facts showing
that there is a genuine issue for trial. If
he does not so respond, summary judgment, if
appropriate, shall be entered against him.
Rule 4-501(5) of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration provides
in part:
The points and authorities in opposition
to a motion for summary judgment shall begin
with a section that contains a concise
statement of material facts as to which the
party contends a genuine issue exists. Each
disputed fact shall be stated in separate
numbered sentences and shall refer with
particularity to those portions of the record
upon which the opposing party relies, and, if
applicable, shall state the numbered sentence
or sentences of the movant's facts that are
disputed. All material facts set forth in the
movant's statement shall be deemed admitted
for the purpose of summary judgment unless
specifically controverted by the opposing
parties' statement.
2

The determinative statute, the entire text of which is reproduced
as an exhibit in Appendix A, is Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-1351(2)
(Supp. 1990) (formerly § 59-10-64(1) (1953)).
V.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS RELEVANT TO APPEAL

The facts pertinent to this appeal are those set forth in the
memorandum in support of FDC's motion for partial summary judgment
and the supporting affidavit of FDC's president, Clarence A.
Persch.

Since Miles did not specifically controvert any of those

facts in opposition to FDC's motion, this Court must take those
facts as established under Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure

and

Administration.

Rule

4-501

of

the

Utah

Code

of

Judicial

Those facts, as set forth in the record below, as

well as relevant procedural facts, are as follows:
1.

On September 13, 1979, FDC as buyer, entered into a

Uniform Real Estate Contract ("UREC") with Barry Lynn Burkinshaw
("Burkinshaw") as seller, for the purchase of the real property
located in Summit County, known as "Lot 5, Stagecoach Estates, Plat
'C,'" and more particularly described as follows:
Commencing at a point North 1392.47 feet and
West 4357.86 feet of the Southeast corner of
Section 32, Township 1 North, Range 4 East,
Salt Lake Base and Meridian and running thence
South 45°0' West 1256.38 feet; thence South
40°30' East 384.71 feet; thence North 44°00'
East 1202.27 feet; thence North 31°53' West
372.25 feet to beginning.
(R. 2-3, 167, 169-70)
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2.

On September 18, 1979, FDC recorded in the office of the

Summit County Recorder a Notice of Contract regarding the UREC
(R. 3, 12, 170, 180-81).
3.

Burkinshaw, the seller under the UREC, had acquired the

property by quitclaim deed from M. Vaughn Bitner ("Bitner") on or
about November 30, 1978 (R. 170, 211, 213-14).
4.

Bitner and his wife subsequently executed a quitclaim

deed conveying the subject property to Burkinshaw on or about
September 13, 1979.

That deed was recorded in the office of the

Summit County Recorder on or about September 18, 1979 (R. 170,
217) .
5.

FDC made regular payments as required by the UREC until

the agreed-upon purchase price of $18,550.00, plus interest, was
paid in full (R. 167, 170).
6.

During the executory period of the UREC, FDC inquired of

the Summit County Assessor's office as to its liability for payment
of real property taxes on the subject property.

FDC was told in

response that the title work on the subdivision, of which the
subject property is a part, had not been completed; consequently,
the County could not allocate to FDC a portion of the tax liability
on the entire subdivision or otherwise assess to FDC property taxes
on the subject property (R. 168, 171).
1.

In fact, Summit County sent tax notices regarding the

subject property to Bitner (R. 171, 186-87, 195-200).
8.

Real property taxes due on the subject property became

delinquent for the years 1979 to 1984.
4

Summit County at no time

gave FDC notice of any tax delinquency on the subject property by
mail or by personal service (R. 171, 183-84).
9.

Prior to 1987, FDC had no actual notice of any tax

delinquency on the subject property (R. 168, 171).
10.

On or about May 3, 1984, Summit County sent to Bitner by

certified mail, return receipt requested, a notice of final tax
sale to satisfy delinquent property taxes on the subject property
(R. 171, 187, 208-09, 218-21).
11.

Summit County did not give FDC notice of the final tax

sale by mail or by personal service, nor did FDC have actual notice
of the final tax sale at any time before the sale (R. 168, 172,
184).
12.

On May 23, 1984, Summit County sold the subject property

to Bitner at the final tax sale for $637.89. On May 24, 1984, the
County delivered to Bitner a tax deed to the subject property (R.
172 184-85, 210).
13.

Bitner subsequently quitclaimed

his interest

in the

subject property to Miles (R. 172, 215-16).
14.
property.

Summit County does not claim an interest in the subject
Both Burkinshaw and George H. Marx, to whom Burkinshaw

assigned his interest in the UREC, have disclaimed any interest in
the subject property and have offered and tendered to FDC their
respective interests, if any, in the subject property (R. 172, 22223, 231-34, 236).*
Immediately following page 236 and before page 237 of the
record is an unnumbered page. Paragraph 8 of that page, which is
part of George H. Marx's affidavit, also establishes these facts.
5

15.

After learning that Bitner and Miles claimed to own the

subject property pursuant to the tax deed from Summit County, FDC
notified Bitner and Miles that FDC owned the property and demanded
that they return the property to FDC. When they failed and refused
to do so, FDC filed this lawsuit in February 1988 (R. 6, 9).
16.

FDC filed a motion for partial summary judgment on its

First Cause of Action against all defendants, seeking an order
declaring the final tax sale, tax deed and all subsequent purported
conveyances of the subject property invalid and void, and quieting
title to the property in FDC as against the defendants below and
all persons claiming under them.

FDC's motion was supported by a

memorandum of points and authorities and the affidavit of FDC's
president, Clarence A. Persch (R. 164-236).
17.

In response, Bitner and Miles submitted a memorandum of

points and authorities, but chose not to submit counter-affidavits
as required under Rule 56(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
(R. 239-43).

Bitner and Miles also determined not to controvert

specifically in their memorandum any of the facts set forth in
FDC's memorandum to avoid having those facts deemed admitted under
Rule 4-501 of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration (compare R.
169-72 with R. 239-40; see R. 245). Neither Summit County nor any
of the other defendants resisted FDC's motion.

Bitner and Miles

did not request a hearing on the motion as allowed by Rule 4-501 of
the Utah Code of Judicial Administration (R. 257).
18.

On August 10, 1989, the Honorable Timothy R. Hanson,

district court judge, entered a minute entry ruling granting FDC's
6

motion for partial summary judgment for the reasons set forth in
FDC's moving and reply papers (R.257).

That minute entry ruling

was incorporated in an order and judgment dated August 24, 1989 (R.
258-60).

Judge Hanson's order and judgment declared the final tax

sale, Summit

County's tax deed to Bitner and all subsequent

purported conveyances of the subject property invalid and void.
The order and judgment also quieted title to the property in FDC as
against the defendants and all persons claiming under them, and
declared that "Defendants and all persons claiming under Defendants
have no estate, right, title, lien or interest whatever in or to
the subject property" (R. 259).
19.

Miles subsequently sought and obtained an order under

Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure certifying the
order and judgment of August 24, 1989 as a final, appealable
judgment (R. 262-64, 274-76).

This appeal, in which Miles alone

appeals the order and judgment of August 24, 1989, followed.
Even

though

the

facts

recited

above

are

conclusively

established by Miles' failure to controvert them below, Miles
attempts to introduce new alleged facts and inferences in her brief
on appeal.

Her attempt to introduce new allegations does not

create a genuine issue of material fact; accordingly, the Court
should not even consider those alleged facts.

Nevertheless, FDC

disputes the following alleged facts contained in Miles' statement
of the case with appropriate citations to the record as to the true
facts:

7

1.

Contrary to Miles1

assertion, there is nothing from

Summit County in the record to confirm that taxes were assessed on
the subject property as a separate parcel or that taxes were paid
as early as 1978 (cf. Miles' brief at 7).
2.

FDC does not dispute Miles' contention that FDC agreed to

pay future tax assessments (Miles' brief at 7).

FDC does, however,

contend that it was never assessed taxes on the property, and that
Summit County informed FDC that taxes could not be assessed to the
property as a single unit (R. 168, 171).
3.

FDC disputes Miles' statement that the title insurance

policy put FDC on notice that 1979 taxes had been assessed on the
property as an individual parcel (Miles' brief at 7-8). The title
insurance policy was never introduced in the record below.
4.

FDC disagrees that the reason Bitner did not pay taxes on

the property from 1979 through 1983 was that he had quit his
interest in the property (<cf. Miles' brief at 8).

The record does

not state why Bitner did not pay the taxes even though he continued
to be assessed for them.

Further, the tax assessment notices

Bitner received specifically state:
please forward to new owner"

"If property has been sold,

(R. 197-200).

Bitner never did so,

nor did he otherwise alert FDC that taxes had been assessed (see R.
168).
5.

Contrary to the suggestion in Miles' brief, Summit County

did not deny, in response to FDC's motion below, having informed
FDC that taxes could not be allocated to the property as a single
unit (Miles' brief at 8). Summit County had previously denied so
8

informing FDC in response to FDCfs requests for admission, but that
denial was based on the fact that none of several then current
county officials were aware of such a conversation with FDC (R.
183, 185). Importantly, Summit County never submitted an affidavit
to controvert FDCf s sworn statements about the conversation adduced
in support of FDC's summary judgment motion (nor did Miles or any
other party), nor did Summit County otherwise resist FDC's motion.
6.

FDC disagrees with Miles' statement that Bitner was the

owner of record in 1984 when he received by mail the notice of
final tax sale (Miles1 brief at 8). Even though Bitner continued
to receive tax assessment notices after conveying the property to
Burkinshaw, his quitclaim deed to Burkinshaw, as well as FDC's
Notice of Contract, had already been recorded in September 1979 (R.
12, 217).
7.

FDC disputes Miles' allegations that she paid taxes on

the property from 1984 through 1988, and that in reliance on her
clear title, she placed a dwelling on the property and has made
other improvements and has been in quiet use and enjoyment of the
property

since

1984

(Miles' brief

at

8-9).

None

of

these

allegations were supported by affidavit in response to FDC's motion
for partial summary judgment; therefore, they were not considered
by the court below and may not be properly considered on appeal.
8.

FDC disagrees with Miles statement that Summit County

indicates that the legal description in FDC's Notice of Contract is
indefinite (Miles' brief at 9).

As set forth on p. 40, infra, the

legal description in FDC's Notice of Contract is identical to the
9

description in the tax assessment notices, notice of final tax
sale, and tax deed (R. 182, 195-200, 210, 220). Further, Summit
County did not oppose FDC's motion for partial summary judgment,
nor has it appealed the order granting FDC's motion. With respect
to this and the other disputed facts noted above, Miles cannot
create on appeal genuine factual issues by relying on allegations
that were never properly submitted in response to FDC's motion
below.
VI.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

Miles' brief is an impermissible attempt to reargue the motion
she lost below based on new factual allegations unsupported by the
record and legal arguments that she failed or chose not to raise at
any time in the summary judgment proceedings below.

Since these

new factual allegations and legal theories could not in any way
have

formed

the basis

of

the

lower court's

decision, Miles

improperly attacks that decision as erroneous. The uncontroverted
facts conclusively establish that FDC is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law; therefore, the lower court's judgment in favor of
FDC must be affirmed.
Even though Miles' brief is filled almost entirely with new
factual

allegations

and

legal

arguments

that

should

not

be

considered on appeal, those arguments additionally lack merit and
in no way require reversal of the lower court's judgment.

The

fundamental flaw in Miles' arguments is that she fails to recognize
that the requirements for a valid final tax sale, which involves a
permanent

"taking" of

real property,
10

are different

from the

requirements for annual assessment of real property taxes. A valid
final tax sale requires that every recorded interest holder whose
identity is reasonably ascertainable receive notice of the sale by
mail or other means as certain to ensure actual notice. Notice by
mail to interest holders of record is required by the tax sale
statutes, which are strictly construed in favor of the tax debtor.
Such notice is also a constitutional requirement, as declared by a
long line of United States Supreme Court cases.
By recording

its Notice of Contract, FDC became legally

entitled to notice reasonably calculated to apprise FDC of the
final tax sale and afford FDC an opportunity to bid at the sale.
It is undisputed that FDC never received such notice, and that it
did not learn that its property had been sold until some three
years after the sale. FDC was thus deprived of its property rights
in violation of the tax sale statutes and without due process of
law.

The lower court's judgment declaring the tax sale void as a

matter of law should therefore be affirmed.
Further, Miles' arguments that FDC did not do enough to
entitle it to notice by mail and that, in any case, FDC should have
been aware that a tax sale would eventually be held are incorrect
and irrelevant. First, FDC's recorded interest in the property was
sufficient to entitle FDC to notice by mail or personal service.
Second, as a matter of undisputed fact, FDC was not aware that
taxes had been assessed individually on its property, which was
still

part

of

a subdivision

yet

to be

recorded.

And

the

controlling United States Supreme Court authority holds that even
11

if a sophisticated

interest holder of record could otherwise

ascertain that property taxes are delinquent, the government must
still send the recorded interest holder notice of the final tax
sale by mail or equivalent means.
In addition, Miles1 purported predecessor in title, defendant
Bitner, was not a bona fide purchaser at the tax sale.

He

continued to receive tax assessment notices and received a notice
of the final tax sale after he had conveyed the property away.
Rather than notifying Summit County or his grantee of this error,
he simply waited until the property came up for tax sale and
purchased it for a fraction of its fair market value.

Fairness

favors FDC, which had faithfully made payments under its uniform
real estate contract, but which, through a no fault of its own, did
not receive notice of the tax sale until long after the sale had
occurred.
The lower court correctly granted FDC's motion for partial
summary judgment since there are no genuine issues of material
fact.

Miles failed to controvert any of the material facts set

forth in the memorandum and affidavit FDC submitted to the court
below.

Since as a matter of undisputed fact FDC did not receive

notice of the tax sale by mail or its equivalent, the lower court
correctly decided, as a legal matter, that the notice of the tax
sale was constitutionally inadequate. The lower court, therefore,
was correct in declaring the tax sale invalid, and its judgment
should be affirmed.

12

VII.
A.

ARGUMENT

The Lower Court's Order Granting Summary
Judgment Should Be Affirmed Because There
Is No Genuine Issue as to Any Material
Fact and Plaintiff FDC Is Entitled to
Judgment as a Matter of Law.

This Court has repeatedly emphasized the standard of review to
be utilized in considering appeals from orders granting summary
judgments:
A grant of summary judgment is appropriate only when no genuine issues of material
fact exist and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. In determining
whether the trial court properly found that
there was no genuine issue of fact, we view
the facts and inferences therefrom in a light
most favorable to the losing party. And in
deciding whether the trial court properly
granted judgment as a matter of law to the
prevailing party, we give no deference to the
trial court's view of the law; we review it
for correctness.
Utah State Coalition of Senior Citizens v. UP&L Co., 776 P.2d 632,
634 (Utah 1989) (citations omitted).

Applying this standard of

review to the facts of this case, this Court should affirm the
lower court's order granting summary judgment. There is no genuine
issue as to any material fact based upon appellant Miles' failure
below to contest the facts FDC asserted in support of its motion,
and FDC is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
1.

Summary Judgment Was Properly Entered Since
There Is No Genuine Issue as to Any Material
Fact.

In the proceedings below, Miles failed or chose not to comply
with Rule 56(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and Rule 4-501
of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration in contesting facts
13

offered by FDC in support of its motion for summary judgment.
Thus, in considering

on appeal whether any genuine

issue of

material fact exists, this Court should only consider the statement
of facts contained in the memorandum in support of FDC's motion for
summary judgment.

As this Court stated in Busch Corp. v. State

Farm Fire and Casualty Co., 743 P.2d 1217 (Utah 1987):
Rule 56(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure provides in part:
Further, when a motion for summary
judgment is made and supported as
provided in this rule, an adverse
party may not rest upon the mere
allegations or denials of his
pleading, but his response, by
affidavits or as otherwise provided
in this rule, must set forth
specific facts showing that there is
a genuine issue for trial. If he
does
not
so
respond,
summary
judgment, if appropriate, shall be
entered against him.
The language of this rule
Indeed, we have previously held:

is clear.

[W]hen a party opposes a properly
supported
motion
for
summary
judgment and fails to file any
responsive
affidavits
or other
evidentiary materials allowed by
Rule 56(e), the trial court may
properly conclude that there are no
genuine issues of fact unless the
face of the movant's affidavit
affirmatively
discloses
the
existence of such an issue. Without
such a showing, the Court need only
decide whether, on the basis of the
applicable law, the moving party is
entitled to judgment.
Id. at 1219 (quoting Franklin Financial v. New Empire Development
Co.,

659

P.2d

1040,

1044

(Utah
14

1983));

accord,

Insley

Manufacturing Corp, v. Draper Bank and Trust, 717 P.2d 1341, 1347
(Utah 1986) .
Accordingly,

ff

[w]hen a motion for summary judgment is filed

and supported by an affidavit, the party opposing the motion has an
affirmative duty to respond with affidavits or the materials
allowed by Rule 56(e)."
(Utah 1989).

DNL Supply v. Saurini, 775 P.2d 420, 421

A party is not permitted to rely on allegations in

its pleadings to defeat a motion for summary judgment and Miles'
failure to submit an affidavit below precludes her from claiming on
appeal that genuine issues of material fact exist.
Applying these principles of law to the facts of this case
demonstrates the correctness of the lower court's decision.

In

support of its motion for summary judgment, FDC submitted the
uncontroverted affidavit of its president, Clarence A. Persch,
evidencing the following facts: FDC executed a uniform real estate
contract for the purchase of the subject property on September 13,
1979.

FDC recorded its Notice of Contract in the office of the

Summit County Recorder on September 18, 1979 (R. 167, 169-70). FDC
made regular payments under the contract until the purchase price
of $18,550 was paid in full (R. 167, 170). Even though FDC had not
received a tax assessment notice on the property, FDC dutifully
contacted the Summit County Assessor's office to inquire about
assessment and payment of property taxes.

In response, Summit

County personnel informed FDC that FDC could not pay taxes on its
individual parcel because the subdivision of which the property is
a part had not been completed and filed.
15

Summit County therefore

could not allocate a portion of the total tax liability on the
entire subdivision to FDC's property as a single unit (R. 168,
171).

FDC never received

property.

notice of tax assessments

on the

In spite of its recorded interest, FDC never received

notice by mail, personal service or otherwise of the final tax sale
of the property as required by statute and the United States
Constitution

(R. 168, 171-72, 184).

As discussed below, this

defect in notice given of the tax sale rendered the tax sale
invalid as a matter of law.
Since Miles chose not to file any affidavits to controvert any
of

these

disregard

factual

averments,

the unsupported

the

trial

statements

court

in Miles1

could

properly

memorandum

in

opposition to FDC's motion. For the same reason, this Court should
conclude that there were no genuine issues of fact presented in the
proceedings below.

See Busch Corp. v. State Farm Fire & Casualty

Co., supra, 743 P.2d at 1219.
In addition to failing to submit affidavits in response to the
affidavit that FDC submitted in support of its summary judgment
motion, Miles also chose not to comply with Rule 4-501 of the Utah
Code of Judicial Administration in her opposition to FDC's motion.
Rule 4-501(5) of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration
(1988) provides:
The points and authorities in opposition
to a motion for summary judgment shall begin
with a section that contains a concise
statement of material facts as to which the
party contends a genuine issue exists. Each
disputed fact shall be stated in separate
numbered sentences and shall refer with
particularity to those portions of the record
16

upon which the opposing party relies, and, if
applicable, shall state the numbered sentence
or sentences of the movant's facts that are
disputed. All material facts set forth in the
movant's statement shall be deemed admitted
for the purpose of summary judgment unless
specifically controverted by the opposing
parties' statement.
(Emphasis added.)
Under this rule, the facts set forth in the statement of facts
contained

in

the

memorandum

supporting

FDC's

motion

are

conclusively established because Miles chose not to controvert them
specifically in her opposing memorandum. Accordingly, Miles should
not be allowed on appeal to alter the statement of those facts,
which establish FDC's entitlement to judgment as a matter of law.
2.

The Court Should Summarily Dismiss
Appellant Miles' New Arguments On
Appeal and Affirm the Lower Court's
Judgment

Miles' arguments on appeal were not raised below and thus
should not be considered by this Court in determining whether the
lower court correctly granted summary judgment in favor of FDC. As
this Court has repeatedly stated in cases involving appeals from
the entry of summary judgment:
[W]hen an argument has not been made in the
trial court, we will not allow it to be raised
on appeal.
For a question to be considered on
appeal, the record must clearly show
that it was timely presented to the
trial court in a manner sufficient
This rule is substantially identical to Rule 4-501(2) (b) of
the Code of Judicial Administration, amended effective January 15,
1990.
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to obtain a ruling thereon; we
cannot merely assume that it was
properly raised. The burden is on
the parties to make certain that the
record they compile will adequately
preserve their arguments for review
in the event of an appeal.
Busch Corp. v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co./ supra/ 743 P.2d at
1219 (citing Insley Manufacturing Corp. v. Draper Bank and Trust/
supra7 717 P.2d at 1347; and quoting Franklin Financial v. New
Empire Development Co./ supra, 659 P.2d at 1045).

Thus, "[i]t is

axiomatic that defenses and claims not raised by the parties in the
trial

cannot

be

considered

for

the

first

time

on

appeal."

Banqerter v. Poulton/ 663 P.2d 100, 102 (Utah 1983) (citations
omitted).
The lower court considered FDC's arguments that the notice of
final tax sale was statutorily and constitutionally defective and
that FDC was entitled as a matter of law to an order declaring the
tax sale void. Miles chose to respond to those arguments merely by
raising two equitable arguments.
arguments

on

appeal,

including

She did not raise any of her
her

arguments

concerning

the

interpretation of Utah statutes governing tax sale notices and the
constitutional adequacy of notice to FDC, until this appeal. Under
the authorities cited above, Miles' arguments on appeal should not
be considered
affirmed.

and the lower court's judgment should be summarily

See Busch Corp. v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co.,

supra, 743 P.2d at 1219.
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B.

The Lower Court's Judgment Should be Affirmed Because FDC, An Interest Holder of
Record/ Did Not Receive Notice of the Tax
Sale as Required By Utah Statutes, and the
Sale was Consequently Invalid,

Miles1

first argument on appeal was never raised in the

proceedings below, and therefore should be dismissed summarily as
falling outside the scope of this Court's review. In addition, her
argument lacks merit.
Miles contends that the lower court erred in interpreting the
Utah statutes governing the notice requirements for a tax sale.
Miles also baldly asserts that FDC did not take sufficient steps to
assure that it would be assessed taxes on the subject property,
claiming that FDC was not entitled to notice of the tax sale
because it had not been assessed taxes.
Miles' argument is fundamentally flawed for two principal
reasons.

First, there is no indication that the lower court

interpreted any of the statutes cited by Miles in arriving at its
conclusion that the tax sale was invalid (See R. 257-60).

Miles

did not rely on any of those statues in the proceedings below; she
should

not

be

interpretation

allowed

to

raise

the

issue

for the first time on appeal.

of

statutory

Second, Miles'

position unreasonably limits the persons entitled to notice of a
final tax sale to those who have already received notice that taxes
are delinquent.3

As set forth below, Miles has erroneously failed

As applied to the facts of this case, Miles' reasoning is
circular: if FDC had received notice of any tax assessment, FDC
would have paid the taxes assessed and there would not have been a
tax sale.
The uncontroverted affidavit of Clarence A. Persch
establishes that FDC attempted unsuccessfully to pay any taxes
19

to differentiate between entitlement to notice of tax assessment
and entitlement to notice of final tax sale.

As a matter of law,

FDC was entitled to notice of the final tax sale under Utah
statutes.
1.

Statutes Governing Tax Sales Are
Strictly Construed In Favor of
The Taxpayer.

This Court has consistently applied the rule of strictissimi
juris to tax sale procedures.

See, e.g., Salt Lake Home Builders,

Inc. v. Colman, 518 P.2d 165 (Utah 1974); Page v. McAfee, 26 Utah
2d

208,

487

P.2d

861

(1971);

Tintic

Undine

Ercanbrack, 93 Utah 561, 74 P.2d 1184 (1938).

Mining

Co.

v.

In order for a tax

sale to be valid to convey title, the statutes governing the sale
must

be strictly

followed.

For example,

in Salt Lake Home

Builders, Inc. v. Colman and Page v. McAfee, supra, this Court
overturned tax sales that were conducted by employees of county
auditors because the employees had not been duly deputized.
The Salt Lake Home Builders Court declared:
[T]he main purpose of all of the taxing
procedures is to enforce the payment of taxes,
and not the confiscation
of property.
Although it is true that confiscation may be
the final and drastic measure, it should
result only as the ultimate necessity to the
accomplishment of the main objective. It is
evident that that is the intent of our
statutes; and consistent therewith it is also
the practically universal rule of decisional
owing on the property (R. 168). It strains credulity to conclude
that FDC would have allowed the property to be sold for some six
hundred dollars ($600.00) in back taxes at about the same time it
was paying nearly twenty thousand dollars ($20,000.00) to purchase
the property.
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law: that the sovereign (taxing authority) is
required to follow procedures prescribed by
law with accuracy and particularity before it
can forfeit one's property.
518 P.2d at the 168 (footnote omitted).
In Fivas v. Peterson, 5 Utah 2d 280, 300 P.2d 635 (1956), this
Court addressed a flaw in a tax sale procedure that was even more
serious than the defect in the Salt Lake Home Builders and Page
cases cited above.

In Fivas, the Court reversed a judgment

quieting title in purchasers of property at a tax sale as against
the previous owners who had failed to pay taxes on the property
because the previous owners had never received notice of tax
assessments or of the final tax sale.

The purchasers contended

that an amendment to the tax notice statutes had shifted the burden
to taxpayers to ascertain and pay taxes when due, whether they
received notice of assessment or not.

In response, the Court

stated:
In considering the above contention, it
is necessary to keep in mind the fundamental
principles which have been established since
time immemorial underlying adjudications on
tax titles. The forfeiture of one's property
for the nonpayment of taxes has always been
regarded as a harsh procedure, which may work
great hardships on property owners.
An
awareness of this fact invariably pervades the
decisions in such cases, with the result that,
in the interpretation and application of
statutory
requirements
antecedent
to
forfeiture of property, they are construed in
favor of the taxpayer and against the taxing
authority, and are strictissimi juris. These
rules are basic to taxation law.
Id., 300 P.2d at 637 (footnotes omitted); see Fredricksen v.
LaFleur, 632 P.2d 827, 828 (Utah 1981).
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The consistent decisions of this Court make it clear that
statutes governing tax sales, which operate as a forfeiture of the
taxpayer's property, must be construed narrowly and in favor of the
tax debtor.
2.

Utah Statutes Require that Notice
of Final Tax Sales Be Sent to All
Interest Holders of Record.

Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-1351

(Supp. 1990) sets

forth the

procedural requirements for final tax sales. Subsection 2 of that
section, which is substantially the same as its predecessor statute
in effect at the time of the tax sale in 1984, provides for the
giving of notice of final tax sale:
(2) Notice of final tax sale shall be
published four times in a newspaper published
and having general circulation in the county,
once in each of four successive weeks
immediately preceding the date of sale. If no
newspaper is published in the county, the
notice shall be posted in five public places
in the county, as determined by the auditor,
at least 25 but no more than 30 days prior to
the date of sale. Notice of sale shall also
be sent by certified mail to the last known
recorded
owner and all other recorded
lienholders, according to the deed, as of the
preceding March 31, at their last-known
address. In the case of the sale of the total
parcel of property, unrecorded or unnotified
lienholders may assert their liens against
unclaimed property to the extent that money is
available to satisfy the liens.
(Emphasis added.)
The obvious purpose of this statute is to apprise all interest
holders of record that the property will be sold to satisfy
delinquent taxes.
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In its earlier form in effect at the time of the tax sale,
Utah Code Ann. § 59-10-64(1) (1953), this statute required that
notice be sent by mail only to the last known recorded owner. The
amendment does not broaden the statute's original purpose, to give
notice of the tax sale to interested parties of record, as declared
by long-standing decisions of this Court.

See Fivas v. Petersen,

supra, 300 P.2d at 639; Olsen v. Baqley, 10 Utah 492, 37 P.734
(1894).

Rather, the amendment merely attempts to codify the

constitutionally mandated requirements for notice.

See Mennonite

Board of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791 (1983); Mullane v. Hanover
Bank and Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).4
In

Fivas

v.

Petersen,

supra,

the

Court

emphasized

the

importance of giving statutory notice:
So far as the taxpayer is concerned, the
giving of notice is the most critical aspect
of the procedure which looks toward the
forfeiture of his property.
An elemental
requisite of deprivation of one of his
property by process of law is notice in some
manner.

Further, FDC was the recorded equitable owner of the
property at the time of the final sale. Bitner, who received
notice by mail of the tax sale, certainly was not the owner of
record because his quitclaim deed to Burkinshaw and Burkinshaw's
contract with FDC were recorded long before the sale. If Summit
County had even sent notice by mail to Burkinshaw, FDC may have
been apprised of the sale because FDC was in privity with
Burkinshaw, the seller under the UREC. Cf. Mennonite Board of
Missions v. Adams, supra, 462 U.S. at 799 (notice to party not in
privity with interested party was insufficient). It is undisputed
that Summit County failed to comply strictly with the statute in
either form because it sent notice of the final tax sale to the
wrong person. That defect renders the tax sale invalid as a matter
of law.
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Id., 300 P.2d at 639. The Court went on to hold that the county's
failure to meet the statutory notice requirement invalidated the
final tax sale.

See also Olsen v. Baqley, 10 Utah 492, 37 P. 739

(1894) (failure to give statutory notice is not a mere irregularity, but a jurisdictional defect).
Here,

Summit

county

failed

to comply

strictly with the

statutory tax sale procedure in that it failed to send notice of
the tax sale by certified mail to FDC, the recorded equitable owner
of the property.

In light of the authorities cited above, the

lower court was therefore correct in determining that the tax sale
was invalid.
3.

As a Matter of Undisputed Fact, FDC Met the
Statutory Requirements for Entitlement to
Notice of the Final Tax Sale.

As set forth above, FDC recorded its interest in the subject
property with the Summit County Recorder on September 18, 1879.
That is all FDC was required to do in order to be entitled to
notice that the property would be sold to satisfy delinquent taxes.
For the first time on appeal, Miles contends that FDC should
have filed a formal request with the Summit County Assessor to
receive tax assessment notices.

Since FDC did not do so, she

reasons, it was not entitled to notice that its recorded interest
would be extinguished in the eventual tax sale of the property.
Miles' position not only ignores the statutory requirement for
receiving notice, see Fivas v. Petersen, supra, 300 P.2d at 637
(tax notice statutes do not shift the burden to the taxpayer to
ascertain and pay taxes when due regardless of whether notice is
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mailed to the taxpayer), with which FDC complied, but it also
impermissibly disregards the uncontroverted facts contained in the
record below.
The

record

is clear

that

in addition

to recording

its

interest, FDC sought to pay property taxes even though it had not
received an assessment notice from the County, and contacted the
Summit County Assessor's office to do so.

In response to FDC's

inquiries, Summit County erroneously informed FDC that FDC could
not pay the taxes because taxes were not allocable to the property
as an individual unit (R. 168, 171).5

Miles now contends that FDC

should not have relied on this information, and should have done
much more.

In essence, Miles is saying that FDC should have

second-guessed the constituted governmental authority responsible
for assessing and collecting taxes on the property, and that FDCfs
failure to do so somehow nullified its statutory entitlement to
notice of the tax sale.
FDC

cannot

be

That contention is patently absurd.

faulted

received from Summit County.

for relying

on misinformation

it

Importantly, Summit County did not

resist FDC's motion for partial summary judgment in the proceedings
below, and none of the other parties below controverted FDC's

Miles did not attempt to controvert these facts, which were
set forth in a sworn affidavit, in the proceedings below.
In
response to a request for admission, Summit County initially denied
the conversations referred to for lack of information (R. 183,
185). But it subsequently determined not to refute FDC's affidavit
or otherwise oppose FDC's motion for partial summary judgment.
Since Miles did not file any counter-affidavits below, the Court
should summarily dismiss her present attempt to bootstrap a factual
issue into existence by relying on Summit County's initial defense
of this lawsuit.
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averments regarding its good faith attempts to pay taxes on the
property.
In

light

of

the undisputed

facts, FDC was

entitled

to

statutory notice of the final tax sale, and it did not lose that
entitlement

by purportedly

failing to take all of the steps

necessary to receive notice of previous tax assessments• See Fivas
v, Petersen, supra.
4.

Miles Improperly Confuses the Notice
of Tax Assessment With the Notice of
Final Tax Sale, Which Must be Sent to
All Recorded Interest Holders,

Miles contends that only those who are entitled to notice of
property tax assessment (who, she asserts, are exclusively legal
title holders and persons formally requesting such notice) are
entitled to notice of the final tax sale. Miles reasons that since
FDC did not hold legal title to the property, Utah statutes did not
allow it to receive notice of the final tax sale unless it had made
a formal request to the Summit County Assessor for notice of tax
assessments.

In support of this argument, Miles cites several

statutes regarding the respective duties of the county recorder,
county assessor and county treasurer.
Miles' argument lacks merit in that it fails to recognize the
fundamental distinction between notice of tax assessment and notice
that the property will be sold to satisfy delinquent taxes.

The

former does not require publication because only those who are
legally responsible to pay the taxes need to be advised that they
are due.

See Dillman v. Foster, 656 P.2d 974, 977 (Utah 1982)

(payment of property taxes is a personal obligation of the one
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assessed).

The latter requires publication as well as notice by

mail to all recorded lienholders to give all interested parties an
opportunity to protect their interests in the property from the
harsh results of forfeiture.

See Fivas v. Peterson, supra; Utah

Code Ann. § 59-2-1351(2) (Supp. 1990).
Further, the statutes Miles cites with respect to the duties
of various county officials all pertain to the assessment of taxes,
not the sale of property to satisfy delinquent taxes.

Miles'

reliance on those statutes is therefore misplaced.
Miles also relies on Fivas v. Petersen, supra, to excuse
county assessors for looking only to the information they receive
from county recorders in determining to whom they will send tax
assessment notices. The conclusion Miles draws from Fivas ignores
the holding of that case, that the tax sale was invalid because the
county

failed

to take adequate steps to send notice to the

taxpayer, whose interest was of record.

300 P.2d at 638-40.

Moreover, the Court said that if the county recorder, assessor and
treasurer collectively fail to perform their duties, their failure
is chargeable to the county itself, ^d, at 637. Consequently, it
is immaterial that FDC recorded its interest with the Summit County
Recorder rather than filing a formal request for tax assessment
notices with the Summit County Assessor. The county as a whole had
a duty to send notice of the final tax sale to FDC because of FDC's
recorded interest in the property.
Miles has improperly confused the notice requirements for tax
assessments with the notice requirements for final tax sales. The
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statutes and cases upon which Miles relies are inapposite because
the only relevant issue is whether FDC should have received, and
did receive, notice of the final tax sale, not whether FDC was
entitled to annual notice of tax assessments.
C.

The Lower Court's Judgment Declaring the Final
Tax Sale Void Should Be Affirmed Because FDC
Did Not Receive Adequate Notice of the Sale as
Required by Due Process.

Miles second argument, that FDC received constitutionally
adequate notice of the final tax sale of the subject property,
should be dismissed summarily for being raised for the first time
on appeal.6 In addition, the argument is without merit and ignores
established case law setting forth the due process requirements for
adequate notice.
1.

Miles

claims

Relevant United States Supreme Court
Decisions Mandate That Notice By Mail
or Equivalent Means Be Given to All
Reasonably Ascertainable Interested
Parties.
that

notice by publication

in a newspaper

circulated solely in Summit County, as well as notice by certified
mail

to

Bitner,

the

purported

owner

of

record,

constituted

sufficient notice to FDC for purposes of due process (see Miles1
brief at 16-17).

That contention flies in the face of numerous

United States Supreme Court decisions interpreting the Due Process
To bolster her argument, Miles relies on a document
(Exhibit "A" attached to Miles' brief) that was never made part of
the record below.
As explained in footnote 8, infra, that
document, a title insurance policy issued to FDC with respect to
the property, has no bearing on whether FDC received adequate
notice of the tax sale. Nevertheless, since the document was never
considered by the lower court, this Court should decline to include
it in the Court's review of the lower court's decision.
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Clause in relation to notice requirements before a constitutional
"taking."

See, e.g., Mennonite Board of Missions v. Adams, 462

U.S. 791 (1983); Schroeder v. New York City, 371 U.S. 208 (1962);
Walker v. City of Hutchinson, 352 U.S. 112 (1956); Mullane v.
Central Hanover Trust Co. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
Miles cites two of these cases, Mennonite Board of Missions
and Mullane, but attempts to distinguish them factually.

Miles'

attempted distinctions do not diminish the force of the paramount
principles enunciated

in those decisions and, in fact, those

principles have direct application to the facts of this case.
In Mullane, the seminal decision on the notice requirements of
due process, the Court struck down a New York banking law governing
judicial settlement of accounts with respect to a common trust
fund.

Pursuant to that law, the trustee notified beneficiaries of

the judicial proceeding, which potentially could have cut off the
beneficiaries' rights against the trustee for mismanagement, only
by publication in a local newspaper.

339 U.S. at 309-11.

Court held that such notice was insufficient

The

for due process

purposes where the names and addresses of the beneficiaries were
known.

Id.

at 319-20.

The Court defined
proceeding

constitutionally

affecting property

adequate notice of a

interests as

"notice reasonably

calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested
parties

of

the

pendency

of

the

action

opportunity to present their objections."
omitted).

and

afford

an

Jd. at 314 (citations

Newspaper publication alone is insufficient:
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them

It would be idle to pretend that
publication alone as prescribed here, is a
reliable means of acquainting interested
parties of the fact that their rights are
before the courts. . . . Chance alone brings
to the attention of even a local resident an
advertisement in small type inserted in the
back pages of a newspaper, and if he makes his
home outside the area of the newspaper's
normal
circulation
the
odds
that
the
information will never reach him are large
indeed.
Id. at 315.
The constitutional principles expressed in Mullane have direct
application here. The tax sale in May 1984 operated to deprive FDC
of its equitable interest in the subject property, for which it had
paid some twenty thousand dollars. See Bill Nay & Sons Excavating
v. Neeley Construction, Co., 677 P.2d

1120, 1121 (Utah 1984)

(purchaser under a real estate contract has an equitable interest
in the property); £f. Mennonite Board of Missions v. Adams, supra,
462 U.S. at 798 (mortgagee has a legally protected interest, and is
entitled to notice of a pending tax sale). FDC was an identifiable
interested party because its name and address appeared on the face
of the Notice of Contract recorded in the office of the Summit
County

Recorder.

Notice by publication

in a Summit

County

newspaper was not reasonably calculated to apprise FDC, a resident
of Salt Lake County, of the pendency of the tax sale; in fact, FDC
had no notice of the tax sale until more than three years after it
was held.

Under Mullane and its progeny, the notice of the tax

sale was constitutionally insufficient. Consequently, the tax sale
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was invalid, and the lower court's decision so holding should be
affirmed.
Further, Miles' attempt to distinguish Mullane fails.

In

dictum, the Mullane Court said that "publication traditionally has
been accepted as notification supplemental to other action which in
itself may reasonably be expected to convey a warning."
316.

Jd. at

When a governmental entity seizes or enters upon tangible

property, that action "may reasonably be expected to come promptly
to the owner's attention, . . . [and] publication or posting
affords an additional measure of notification."

Id.

Here their

was no noticeable "direct attack" on FDC's property interest;
Summit County did not physically enter upon the property or post
notification on it.

It was therefore highly improbable that FDC

would be apprised of the pending tax sale by publication alone. In
addition, the Court's subsequent decision in Mennonite Board of
Missions makes no distinction between interests in tangible and
intangible property.
In Mennonite Board of Missions v. Adams, supra, the United
States Supreme Court followed Mullane in reversing a judgment that

Miles also contends that notice by certified mail to
Bitner, "the owner of record," satisfied due process requirements
(see Miles brief at 16-17).
It would be naive to assume that
Bitner, who received notice of tax assessments for five years after
he had conveyed the property to Burkinshaw, and who eventually
repurchased the property at the tax sale for a fraction of its
value, would inform FDC of the pending tax sale. Therefore, the
notice by mail to Bitner was not reasonably calculated to reach FDC
as required by due process. Cf. Mennonite Board of Missions v.
Adams, supra, 462 U.S. at 799 (notice to property owner, who is not
in privity with his creditor, cannot be expected to lead to notice
to mortgagee).
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had upheld the Indiana tax sale statute against the challenge of a
mortgagee of record that had not received notice of the tax sale of
the mortgaged property. Pursuant to the Indiana statute, the owner
of record received notice of the tax sale by certified mail, but
the only other notice given was by publication in a local newspaper
and posting

in the county courthouse.

The mortgagee, whose

interests were extinguished by the tax sale, did not receive actual
notice of the sale until long after it took place.

The Supreme

Court held that the statutory notice by publication and by mail to
the owner of record alone did not meet the requirements of due
process.

See 462 U.S. at 800.

Such notice by itself it not

reasonably calculated to reach interested parties. The Court went
on to state:
Notice by mail or other means as certain to
ensure
actual
notice
is
a
minimum
constitutional pre-condition to a proceeding
which will adversely affect the liberty or
property interests of any party. . . i f its
name and address are reasonably ascertainable.
Id. (emphasis in original).
In this case, the minimum constitutional pre-condition to the
validity of the final tax sale, which adversely affected FDC's
property interests, was not met.

FDC was never served by mail or

other means as certain to ensure actual notice even though FDC's
name and address were reasonably ascertainable from the recorded
Notice of Contract.

That defect in the notice given of the tax

sale deprived FDC of its interests without due process of law. See
also Fivas v. Petersen, supra, 300 P.2d at 634-40. The lower court
was therefore correct in declaring the tax sale, the tax deed to
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Bitner

and Bitner's

subsequent

purported

conveyance

to Miles

invalid.
Mennonite Board of Missions is on all fours with this case,
and Miles1 attempted distinction is meritless.

Miles argues that

the mortgagee in Mennonite Board of Missions "was at the mercy of
the property owner to pay the taxes on the property," and that the
owner's failure to pay the taxes entitled the mortgagee, which
otherwise "would not be aware of any arrearage or tax sales," to
personal or mailed notice.

Miles1 brief at 18-19.

Here, Miles

contends that FDC was responsible to pay taxes on the property, and
that FDC's failure to do so, not the failure of any third party,
caused the property to be sold at the tax sale.
Miles' attempted distinction ignores the holding of Mennonite
Board of Missions. Apparently, in response to an argument that the
mortgagee in that case should have taken steps to determine whether
property taxes were delinquent and a tax sale pending, the Court
said:
Personal service or mailed notice is required
even though sophisticated creditors have means
at their disposal to discover whether property
taxes have not been paid and whether tax sale
proceedings are therefore likely to be
initiated.
In the first place, a mortgage
need
not
involve a complex
commercial
transaction among knowledgeable parties, and
it may well be the least sophisticated
creditor whose security interest is threatened
by a tax sale. More importantly, a party's
ability to take steps to safeguard its
interests does not relieve the State of its
constitutional obligation.
It is true that
particularly extensive efforts to provide
notice may often be required when the State is
aware
of
a
party's
inexperience
or
incompetence. . . . But it does not follow
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that the State may forgo [sic] even the
relatively modest administrative burden of
providing notice by mail to parties who are
particularly resourceful.
462 U.S. at 799-800 (citations and footnote omitted; emphasis
added).

Therefore, the constitutional pre-condition of adequate

notice to FDC, a recorded interest holder, cannot be foregone
merely because FDC allegedly did not take sufficient steps to
protect

its

own

interest

in the property.

Miles' position

impermissibly attempts to shift the burden to the taxpayer to
ascertain whether and when a final tax sale will be held.

See

Fivas v. Petersen# supra, 300 P.2d at 637.
Further, as pointed out above, FDC did take steps to safeguard
its interest in the property by recording the Notice of Contract.
That was sufficient to entitle FDC to personal or mailed notice of
the tax sale under the Utah tax sale statutes as well as Mennonite
Board of Missions and Mullane. And FDC did attempt to pay taxes on
the property, for which it had not been assessed, but without
success. The failure to send notice here was not FDC's, but Summit
County's; therefore, Miles' contention that Mennonite Board of
Missions is distinguishable because it involved the failure of a
third party, rather than the party entitled to notice, must fail.
Importantly, Bitner, Miles' immediate predecessor in interest,
was also responsible for the County's failure to apprise FDC of the
tax sale. For five years after Bitner had conveyed the property to
Burkinshaw, Bitner continued to receive tax assessment notices (R.
195-99).

The notices Bitner received for at least three of those

34

years, 1981 to 1983, state: "If property has been sold, please
forward to new owner11

(R. 197-99).

Bitner evidently knew that FDC was purchasing the property
under a real estate contract because Bitner and his wife executed
a new quit claim deed to Burkinshaw on September 13, 1979.

That

was the same day the UREC was executed, nearly a year after Bitner
had originally quitclaimed the property to Burkinshaw.

Both the

new quitclaim deed and FDC's Notice of Contract were recorded five
days later at the request of Granite Title Company (see R. 182,
217).

The Court may reasonably infer that Granite Title handled

FDC's purchase of the property from Burkinshaw, and that Granite
Title required Bitner to execute the new quitclaim deed in order to
establish in the record the chain of title from Bitner to FDC.
Bitner*s failure to forward the tax assessment notices or
notice of tax sale to FDC, or even to alert Summit County that he
no longer had any interest in the property, is inexcusable.
light of FDCfs unsuccessful

attempt

In

to obtain notice of tax

assessments from Summit County, FDC was "at the mercy" of Bitner,
who chose not to inform FDC or Summit County of the County's
mistake. These facts emphasize that Mennonite Board of Missions is
controlling here, and Miles' attempted distinction of the case is
meaningless.8

Consequently, the Court should follow that case in

With respect to the constitutional sufficiently of notice
to FDC, Miles again confuses the respective requirements for notice
that taxes are due and notice that the property will be sold to
satisfy delinquent taxes. She claims that FDC had notice that
taxes would be assessed on the property, relying on, among other
things, provisions in the UREC regarding payment of taxes and a
reference to the assessment of taxes in the title insurance policy
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affirming the lower court's ruling that constitutionally inadequate
notice rendered the tax sale invalid.
2.

Fairness Requires That
Not Be Deprived of Its
Without Due Process of
dant Miles and Bitner/
Interest, Who Were Not
For Value.

Plaintiff FDC Should
Property Interest
Law in Favor of PeHer Predecessor in
Bona Fide Purchasers

As set forth above, FDC was deprived of its due process rights
because it did not receive notice of the tax sale at which its
property was sold.

Bitner knew that FDC owned the property, or at

the very least that he no longer owned the property, and yet he
never informed

FDC or Summit

County that he was erroneously

continuing to receive tax assessment notices.

Rather, he waited

until the final tax sale, of which he received notice by certified
mail, and then purchased the property for a small percentage of its
value.

Shortly thereafter he quitclaimed the property to Miles.

In Dillman v. Foster, 656 P.2d 974 (Utah 1982), this Court
held that record owners of property could not strengthen their
title as against subsequent transferees by paying at a tax sale the
taxes they were obligated, but had failed, to pay previously.

The

Court placed the burden on record owners who transfer their
interests in property "to make appropriate arrangements for payment
by [their transferees].f! ^d. at 977.
issued by Granite Title Company. But such purported notice is
irrelevant to whether Summit County discharged its constitutional
obligation to advise FDC that the property would be sold to satisfy
back taxes. See Mennonite Board of Missions v. Adams, supra, 462
U.S. at 800. A recorded interest holder's knowledge that tax
payments are delinquent is fundamentally different from knowledge
that a tax sale, where those property interests will be affected,
is pending. See id.
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D.

The Purported Factual Issues Raised By Miles
On Appeal Do Not Defeat FDC's Entitlement to
Summary Judgment.

As set forth above, this Court's review of the lower court's
decision must be confined to the facts before that court as
contained in the record below.

An appellant who fails or chooses

not to controvert facts set forth by way of affidavit in connection
with a motion for summary judgment cannot on appeal reach outside
the record to conjure up issues of fact that were never raised
below. See Busch Corp. v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., supra.
Miles impermissibly attempts to contrive three such purported
factual issues, and in so doing seeks the Court's indulgence in
going beyond the ordinary scope of its review. First, Miles claims
that a factual issue exists as to whether FDC received adequate
notice of the final tax sale.9 However, it is undisputed that FDC
was an interest holder of record and that it never received notice
by mail or personal service of the pending tax sale.

Under the

authorities cited above, those uncontroverted facts are sufficient
to establish the invalidity of the final tax sale as a matter of

Miles asserts that language contained in the UREC and the
title insurance policy (which was not part of the record below)
gave FDC adequate notice that taxes would be assessed on the
property and that the property eventually would be sold for
delinquent taxes.
As established above, such "notice" is not
equivalent to notice that a tax sale is pending, for which notice
by mail or other means as certain to ensure actual notice is a
minimum constitutional requirement. Mennonite Board of Missions v.
Adams, supra, 462 U.S. at 800. Therefore, Miles' contention that
FDC should have been aware that the property would be sold at some
future date if FDC did not pay the taxes on the property (for which
it was never assessed) is entirely irrelevant and does not present
a genuine issue of material fact.
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Additionally,
n e i t h e r M i l e s n o r Summit C o u n t y
ever
c h a l l e n g e d b e l o w t h e a f f i d a v i t of FDC's p r e s i d e n t s t a t i n g t h a t
Summit C o u n t y t o l d FDC i I c o u l d n o t a l l o c a t e t a x e s t o
the
i n d i v i d u a l p a r c e l FDC was p u r c h a s i n g .
Summit C o u n t y c h o s e n o t t o
r e s i s t FDC's m o t i o n f o r p a r t i a l summary j u d g m e n t .

itself to determine whether it identifies property with reasonable
certainty).
A comparison of the legal descriptions contained in FDC's
recorded Notice of Contract (R. 182), the tax assessment notices
and notice of final tax sale (see R. 195-200, 220) and the tax deed
to Bitner (R. 210) reveals that, except for an easement that is not
pertinent here, the descriptions are identical.

Thus, even if

an issue as to the adequacy of the legal description in FDC's
Notice of Contract had been raised below, the lower court correctly
could have concluded, as a matter of law, that FDC's interest was
sufficiently recorded so as to entitle it to notice by mail of the
final tax sale.12
For these reasons, even when the Court views the facts in the
light most favorable to Miles, there still exists no genuine issue

Miles relies on Summit County's initial statement that the
reference in FDC's Notice of Contract to "Lot 5, Stagecoach Estates
Plat 'C'lf was indefinite (see Miles' brief at 20). That statement,
however, was incorrect. Summit County had used the same reference
in its tax assessment notices and the tax deed to Bitner (R. 195200, 210, 220).
The same is true of the metes and bounds
description in FDC's Notice of Contract.
However "vague and
indefinite" the description in FDC's Notice of Contract may be, it
is the same description used in the tax assessment notices, notice
of final tax sale and tax deed. Significantly, Summit County did
not oppose FDC's motion for partial summary judgment.
As a parting shot, Miles alludes to the "length of time
that elapsed prior to bringing this action" (Miles brief at 22).
Her statement is not only completely irrelevant to this appeal
since she did not raise it below as an issue of material fact, it
is also untrue. Miles makes an unsupported assertion that FDC made
no attempt to contact her until it filed this lawsuit in 1988.
However, in 1987 immediately after FDC learned that Miles was
asserting possessory rights to the subject property, FDC made a
written demand that she vacate the property. She failed to do so,
and FDC filed this lawsuit several months later (See R. 6).
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Consequently j Hi Inn. iJid not receive valid title iu the
property and did not convey valid title to Miles, Their; interests,
if any, are inferior to FDC's. See Dillman v. Fosterf supra, 656
P.2d at 978-79. The "paramount" tax title Miles claims, citing
Hansen v. Burris, 86 Utah 424, 46 P.2d 4,;; ,19 35), only vests when
a valid tax title is purchased. See Dillman v. Foster, supra, 656
P.2d at 978-79.

of justice and fair play, the Court should affirm in all respects
the lower court's judgment.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 18th day of July, 1990.
CLYDE, PRATT & SNOW

^y^
Rodney G. Snow
//
Stephen B. Doxey ^
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellee
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59-10-64. Sales by county.—(1) Upon receiving the ; s .*.- from the county treasurer, the county auditor shall immediately advertise
for sale during the month of May all real estate sold to the county at
preliminary sale and not previously redeemed or sold at private sale as
provided in section 59-10-37 and upon which the period of redemption
expired upon March thirty-first next preceding.
Notice of sale shall be published in a newspaper published in the
county and having general circulation therein, four tira.es, once in each
of four successive weeks immediately preceding the date of sale, or if
no such newspaper is published in the county, by posting such notice
in five public places in the county, as determined by the auditor, at least
twenty-five and no more than thirty days prior to the date of sale. Notice
of sale shall also be sent to the last known recorded owner at his last
known address by registered mail.

59-2-1351. Sales by county — Notice of final May tax sale
- Tax deed — Entries on record.
(1) Upon receiving the Final May Tax Sale Listing from the county treasurer, the county auditor shall immediately advertise for sale during the
month of May all real estate sold to the county at preliminary sale and not
previously redeemed and upon which the period of redemption is expiring in
the nearest forthcoming Final May Tax Sale.
(2) Notice of final tax sale shall be published four times in a newspaper
published and having general circulation in the county, once in each of four
successive weeks immediately preceding the date of sale. If no newspaper is
published in the county, the notice shall be posted in five public places in the
county, as determined by the auditor, at least 25 but no more than 30 days
prior to the date of sale. Notice of sale shall also be sent by certified mail to
the last known recorded owner and all other recorded lienholders, according to
the deed, as of the preceding March 31, at their last-known address. In the
case of the sale of the total parcel of property, unrecorded or unnotified lienholders may assert their liens against unclaimed property to the extent that
money is available to satisfy the liens.

